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Abstract
In this article, we first review the history of carbon dioxide (CO2)
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels for the People’s Republic
of China (China). As Chinese regulators have announced efforts to
directly regulate CO2 emissions, we review the history of institutions
charged with climate regulation in China. Next we review China’s
existing market-based approaches to emission control in the form of
the world’s largest effluent fee system for air and water pollutants as
well as seven pilot carbon markets. We conclude with a discussion of
the issues and challenges ahead in adoptingmarket-based instruments
to regulate CO2 emissions in China.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, 255 nations met in Rio de Janeiro for the first Earth Summit to address the issue of
sustainable development. One of the major outcomes of the summit was the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The objective of the treaty was “to
stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (http://unfccc.int/essential_background/
convention/items/6036.php). The framework ultimately led to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which
went into force in February 2005. The two biggest emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs), the
United States ofAmerica and the People’sRepublic ofChina (China), had signed theUNFCCC, yet
of the two only China signed and ratified the Kyoto Protocol. However, this only current global
accord limiting GHG emissions does not require reductions from either country, as China signed
on as an Annex B country, which exempts it from a binding emission reduction commitment.
Twenty-two years have passed since the Rio Earth Summit. Annual global emissions of carbon
dioxide (CO2) from fossil fuel combustion have increased by 55% since then (BP 2014). Emissions
by the United States have increased by 8.9% since 1990, whereas emissions by China have in-
creased by 298% over the same time period. In 1990, the average US citizen was responsible for
10.5 times the GHG emissions of the average Chinese citizen. The gap in per capita terms is
shrinking rapidly. China’s per capita emissions are almost equivalent to those of the European
Union. In 2013, the averageAmerican emitted“only”2.7 times that of the averageChinese person.
In this article, we briefly review the emission trajectory of China, updating some of the data
in the excellent review by Levine & Aden (2008) in the Annual Review of Environment and
Resources. In our review, the data are limited toCO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels,
as this source represents the majority of the growth in historical and anticipated emissions. The
second part of the article reviews the institutions responsible for GHG mitigation and their
evolution within the Chinese government. The third portion of the article provides an overview of
the current market-based pollution control instruments used in China. The final section provides
a discussion of the opportunities for controlling GHG emissions via market-based instruments
going forward.
2. EXAMINING HISTORICAL EMISSIONS
2.1. Emission Trajectory
CO2 emissions are almost never directlymeasured but are instead calculatedmostly on the basis of
fossil fuel consumption (Boden et al. 2013). Themost complete global- andnational-level record of
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion is provided by the Carbon Dioxide Information
Analysis Center (http://cdiac.ornl.gov/). More recent data are available from BP (2014).
During the last few years of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), China’s CO2 emissions were
0.31% of what they are today. During the Republic of China years (1912–1949), emissions grew
5%per year. The first recorded noncoal emissions appeared in 1926 in the form of liquid fuels. By
1949, coal still accounted for 99% of China’s CO2 emissions. During the period under Chairman
Mao (1949–1976), emissions grew11%per year,which resulted in a15-fold increase in emissions.
During this period, the share of coal fell to 76%, and the share of liquid fuels rose to 20%. To put
these figures into a broader perspective, China’s total emissions in 1976 were equal to roughly
12.5% of its emissions in 2013. After Chairman Mao’s passing, which was followed by years of
early market reform from 1977 to 1999, emissions grew by 4.4% per year, resulting in total year
1999 emissions of 35% of what they are today. At 72% in 1999, coal’s emission share was only
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slightly lower than at the time ofMao’s passing, and the share of liquids had also not substantially
changed. During the years 2000–2004, the growth rate of emissions surged to 12.9% p.a. (per
annum), with essentially unchanged shares of emissions from coal and liquids. Since 2004,
emissions have grown at an annual rate of 6.9%,with roughly 70%of emissions still coming from
coal. China became the world’s leading CO2 emitter sometime in late 2006 and by 2011 hadmore
emissions from CO2 from coal alone than the total emissions from all fuels by the second-largest
emitter—the United States.
Figure 1 compares, for these two largest emitters, the trajectory of emissions from coal, liquid
fuels, and gas. There are some noteworthy differences in the two trajectories. First, at the beginning
of the twentieth century, both US and Chinese emissions came almost exclusively from coal.
However, by the end of World War II, the US share of emissions from coal fell to 61% compared
with China’s 98% share. In the United States, 30% of emissions shifted to liquid sources, with
another 9% to gas. The contrast is still sharp today. In the United States, 35% of emissions come
from coal, 40% from liquid fuels, and an impressive and growing 24% from gas. In China, this
composition is heavily skewed toward coal (72%) rather than to liquids (14%) or gas (3%).
Significantly, 11% of Chinese emissions are attributed to the production of cement, which is an
order of magnitude higher than the US share. If we compare US andChinese emissions with global
average emissions, the world emission profile looks more like that of the United States than it does
like that of China. Globally, coal accounted for 43%of global emissions, liquid fuels for 34%, and
gas combustion for 18%. The manufacture of cement accounts for 5% globally and the flaring of
natural gas for 1%.
As emission data are not based on measurements but are rather calculated on the basis of fuel
use, the emission data are only as good as the fuel use data. The twomain sources of measurement
2014
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Figure 1
Themountain of carbon: carbon emissions by fuel type for the United States and China. From the origin to the
middle of the graph,we see the emission trajectory of China. Starting at the right and going to the center, we see
the emission trajectory of theUnited States. The area under the curve (themass of themountain) amounts to the
total historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion from the top two emitters.
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errors are (a) inadequately reported quantity of fuel used and (b) the carbon content of said fuel
used.1 Guan et al. (2012) use national-level data on fuel use and provincial-level data on fuel use to
separately calculate CO2 emissions at the national level. They show that the difference between the
two calculations is equivalent to one year’s worth of Japan’s emissions. Guan et al. (2012) point
out that this differencemay be due to updated coal use data at the national level and that data at the
provincial level may not have been updated. However, emission figures from China have been
questioned due to their politically sensitive nature in the international debate on climate regulation
and mitigation efforts. Z.X. Zhang (2014) also provides an excellent discussion of these issues in
association with energy pricing and subsidy systems in China.
2.2. Drivers of Carbon Emissions
When drivers of CO2 emissions are modeled at an aggregate level, the most commonly invoked
framework is theKaya identity,which is basedonEhrlich&Holdren’s IPAT (impact¼ population3
affluence3 technology) identity. The Kaya identity is more of a conceptual relationship rather than
a specific equation governing the relationship betweenCO2 emissions and their drivers. It is given by
Equation 1:
CO2 ¼ population
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
p
 GDP
population
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
g
 energy
GDP
|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
e
 CO2
energy
|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
c
. ð1Þ
The identity hypothesizes fourmain drivers of CO2 emissions: population (p), per capita affluence
(g), energy intensity ofGDP (e), and carbon intensity of the energy sector (c). The last two terms are
often collapsed into a single term, which is the carbon intensity of the economy (CO2/GDP) (e.g.,
Raupach et al. 2007).
Figure 2 uses the data provided by the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2013) to
show the trajectory for these four drivers for the United States and China. Both countries’
populations have grown relatively rapidly in comparison to those of other developed countries
(e.g., Germany, France, Japan). Between 1971 and 2009, China’s population grew by 490million
(1.2% p.a.), whereas the US population grew by 100 million (1.0% p.a.). The growth in China’s
real per capita GDP is well documented. Over this 40-year period, it grew at 7.8 p.a., resulting in
a 17-fold increase. The US increase in per capita GDP over this time period was 1.79% p.a. and
resulted in a doubling of per capita GDP. If one regards this progress in levels instead of in growth
terms, China’s per capita GDP increased by US$2,081 (2000 number), whereas the US per capita
GDP increased by US$17,900 (2000 number). In summary, both countries became significantly
more wealthy and populous over the past 40 years.
Figure 2c displays the energy intensity of GDP, which is calculated by dividing total energy
consumption byGDP. The energy intensity of GDP in theUnited States fell by 1.96%over this period,
asdocumentedelsewhere (e.g.,Auffhammer2007). In comparison,China’s energy intensity, according
to the World Bank measure of energy consumption, fell at double that rate (by 4.03% per year).
Although the energy efficiency improvements in theChinese economyhave beenwidely studied
and have been the target of repeated policy interventions at the central and provincial levels, they
1The mapping of fuel use to emissions may vary across time and space, as the efficiency of burning fossil fuels depends on the
combustion technology. Improvements in, e.g., boiler heat rates represent one avenue for mitigation, which has to be
empirically captured through adapting this mapping. Further sector-specific opportunities for future carbon sequestration
may significantly alter these conversion factors.
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are not a sufficientmitigationmechanism. Increases in the carbon intensity of the energy consumed
at the economy-wide level can offset or swamp the effects of energy efficiency improvements.
Figure 2d indicates amost interesting divergence between theUnited States andChina according to
theWorld Bank data: The carbon intensity of US energy consumption has fallen at roughly 0.30%
per year, much of which is possibly due to a shift from coal and oil toward less-carbon-intensive
natural gas as an energy source. The opposite has happened in China: The carbon intensity of
energy consumption has grown by 1.11% per year over the past 40 years. Figure 2d shows that
there was a steady increase in this measure until the late 1990s, with a significant drop between
1996 and 2002. The years since 2002 have been marked by a sharp and steady increase in the
carbon intensity of energy, equivalent to a 22% increase over the 1970 value in just 7 years.
3. ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE IN CHINA: AN OVERVIEW OF
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES
Driven by concerns about energy security and sustainable development and by mounting in-
ternational pressure, China has accelerated its efforts to address climate change. The first signs of
a national effort to address climate change emerged in the early 1990s. In 2007, China became the
first country in the developing world to release a comprehensive national climate change plan
(NDRC 2007). In 2009, during the UNFCCC COP15 in Copenhagen, the Chinese government
made a commitment to reduce GHG emissions per unit of GDP by 40–45% relative to a baseline
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Figure 2
The Kaya identity drivers of CO2 emissions: China and the United States. In each panel, the dashed blue line
shows the trajectory for China and the solid red line the trajectory for the United States.
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year of 2005 by 2020. The historical record shows that China has been able to significantly reduce
the energy intensity of the economy, which is of course partially due to the rapid growth rate of its
economy.
According to official statistics, during the eleventh Five-Year Plan (FYP)2 period (2006–2010),
the energy intensity of GDP was reduced by 19.1%, which came close to meeting the 20% re-
duction target set. By 2013, China had managed to cut its energy intensity of GDP by 28.5%
relative to 2005 levels and to increase the share of nonfossil fuel in primary energy to 9.8% (NDRC
2014a). These stepswere achieved through a portfolio of strict top-downpolicies. Inwhat follows,
we review the major institutional arrangements and key current and past policies passed by the
Chinese government to address climate change.
3.1. Institutional Arrangements for Combating Climate Change
The institutional arrangements for addressing climate change at the national level have been
continuously strengthened since the early 1990s. In 1990, the central government established
a National Climate Change Coordination Team to facilitate both governmental engagement in
international negotiations and domestic affairs related to climate change. The team, led by a state
councilor, was under the supervision of the Environmental Protection Commission and set up an
office in the National Meteorology Bureau. In 1998, the team was transformed into the National
Climate Change Strategy Coordination Team, led by the head of the State Planning Commission.
At that point, the team involved more than 10 ministries as institutional members. The State
Planning Commission [now known as the National Development and Reform Commission
(NDRC)] was responsible for coordination between these institutional members. The team set up
physical offices in the State Planning Commission. The Commission retained its authority over the
team for a decade.
In 2007, to strengthen the leadership for combating climate change, conserving energy, and
reducing emissions, the State Council (China’s cabinet) established the National Leading Group
to Address Climate Change, Energy Conservation, and Pollutant Discharge Reduction. This
leading group, headed by the prime minister, is responsible for both international negotiations
and the development of national policies and action plans for climate change mitigation/
adaptation, energy conservation, and pollution control. This leading group is also the main
coordinating body for more than 20 institutional members, which include the NDRC and other
additional ministries, state administrations, and national bureaus. Among these additional
members are the ministries of foreign affairs, finance, and environmental protection; the Na-
tional Bureau of Statistics; and the State Forest Administration. The day-to-day operation of the
leading group is divided into two physical national leading group offices located in the NDRC:
the Leading GroupOffice for Climate Change and the Leading GroupOffice for Energy Savings
and Emission Reductions. The Climate Change Office, which evolved from the previous Na-
tional Climate Change Strategy Coordination Team, is charged with dealing with climate
change issues at the national level as well as the development of national climate policies and
action plans.
The NDRC is the hub for issuing national policies related to climate change. On the one hand,
the two leading group offices are set up within this very powerful state agency. On the other hand,
2Every5 years,China’s central government issues a new FYP that outlines the country’s socioeconomic development goals for
the next 5 years. FYPs arepassedby the StandingCommittee of theNational People’sCongress, the highest level of government
that has the power to legislate. The first FYP was made for the period of 1953–1957.
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the NDRC also plays a major role in coordinating among member institutions to develop and
implement national policies and action plans.
In addition to the national polices, which are issued by the National Leading Group for Energy
Savings and Emission Reductions, institutional members have the authority to develop their own
sector-based policies and action plans to address climate change. For example, the State Forest
Administration issuedThe Forestry Action Plan to Address Climate Change (SFA 2010), and the
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) releasedAnAction Plan for Addressing
Climate Change in the Industry Sector (2012–2020) jointly with the NDRC, the Ministry of
Finance, and the Ministry of Science and Technology (MIIT et al. 2012).
At the provincial level, since 2009, almost all provinces andmunicipalities have also established
leading groups to address climate change. These leading groups, normally headed by the top
provincial and municipality leaders, coordinate among different departments to take collective
action to combat climate change within their own regions. These groups are responsible for
implementing various climate change–related policies that are issued by the central government,
particularly the National Leading Group for Energy Savings and Emission Reductions. These
groups also develop and implement regional policies for addressing climate change, conserving
energy, and controlling pollution. This complex arrangement has resulted in an intricate web of
climate, environmental, and energy policies across China’s provinces and sectors.
3.2. China’s Major Policies for Combating Climate Change
Following the Rio Earth Summit of 1992, the Chinese government issued China Agenda 21: A
White Paper on China’s Population, Environment and Development (State Council 1994). This
agenda laid out general guidelines for addressing climate change. In chapter 18, which is devoted
to environmental protection, the document proposed energy development and tree planting as
important means to control GHG emissions and proposed determining GHG emission targets for
China in accordance with the UNFCCC. The document also recommended the following specific
actions to control GHG emissions in China: (a) saving energy, reducing energy consumption, and
advancing technology in the industrial sector; (b) improving energy efficiency; and (c) increasing
forest cover through afforestation/reforestation for carbon sequestration.
However, climate change was barely mentioned in China’s tenth FYP. The tenth FYP (2001–
2005), in the section entitled “Saving and Protecting Resources for Sustainable Use,” casually
mentioned that China would take part in “global environment and development causes,” would
fulfill its commitment to the international community, andwould takemeasures tomitigate global
climate change. No specific targets or timetables were set.
China strengthened its efforts to address climate change after 2005 in two major ways. First,
reductions in energy consumption and CO2 emissions were included as national mid- and long-
term economic and social development goals to be reached by the country’s eleventh and twelfth
FYPs. In the eleventh FYP (2006–2010), China set forth a binding goal of reducing energy
consumption per unit of GDP in 2010 by 20% relative to 2005 levels. In the twelfth FYP (2011–
2015), the binding goals were to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16% and to
reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP by 17% as well as to increase the share of nonfossil fuels in
primary energy consumption to 11.4% for the period of 2011–2015. The central government
further broke down these goals into subnational targets at the provincial andmunicipal levels and
delegated these subnational targets to provincial and municipal governments to achieve.
Second, to incentivize local government leaders to take effective actions to achieve the sub-
national targets assigned to their regions, the central government tied assessment of local gov-
ernment leaders’ political performance to achievements made in CO2 emission reductions and
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energy conservation. In 2010, the central government also launched an inspection program to
oversee local government leaders’performance regarding energy conservation in18key regions. In
2014, the State Council issued a national policy that specified detailed evaluation criteria and
methods used to assess local government leaders’ performance regarding CO2 emissions
reductions and energy conservation (NDRC 2014b).
During these eleventh and twelfth FYP periods, the Chinese government developed a series of
climate change policies and action plans.Table 1 lists five major national policies and action plans
issued by the central government (by the StateCouncil orNDRC) since 2005.All these policies and
action plans commonly propose six major types of policy measures.
Promoting energy conservation and increasing energy efficiency are one key commonmeasure
taken by all the policies listed in Table 1. Strong legal and financial arrangements were made to
support this measure. In Article 5 of the Energy Conservation Law of People’s Republic of China,
which was first promulgated in 1997 and amended in 2007 (NPC 2007), it is stipulated that
including energy conservation in national or local medium- and long-term economic and social
development plans is mandatory. Article 6 of the law stipulates a system for achieving energy
conservation and an evaluation system, which assesses local leaders’ achievements in energy
conservation. The national government also used subsidies to implement specific programs for
energy conservation, to support R&D, and to promote energy-saving technology adoption; it also
reformed the pricing system for energy products (Z.X. Zhang 2014).
In 2012, the StateCouncil released theTwelfth Five-Year Plan for Energy Saving and Emission
Reduction (see State Council 2012), aiming to transformChina’s economic developmentmode, to
establish an energy-saving and environmentally friendly society, and to strengthen the capacity of
sustainable development. Because the industrial sector is responsible for the lion’s share of energy
consumption (accounting for 70% of energy consumption during the eleventh FYP period), the
Chinese government made a strong effort to increase energy efficiency and promote energy
conservation in the industrial sector. The two most significant national programs are the Energy
Conservation Actions of the Top 1,000 Key Enterprises and Low-Carbon and Energy Conser-
vation Actions of the Top 10,000 Enterprises, which were implemented during the eleventh and
twelfth FYP periods, respectively (NDRC 2011b).
Adjusting the energy mix and developing low-carbon/clean energy are another key measure
taken to reduce CO2 emissions, given that coal production accounted for more than 70% of total
Table 1 Major national policies and action plans for climate change mitigation
Year Policies and action plans Issued by Common measures
2007 China’s National Climate Change
Program
NDRC (2007) 1. Adjusting industrial structure
2. Promoting energy conservation and increasing
energy efficiency
3. Adjusting the energy structure and developing
low-carbon/clean energy
4. Increasing carbon sinks (mainly in the forest
sector)
5. Controlling non-energy-related GHG
emissions
6. Promoting low-carbon initiatives (low-carbon
cities, local carbon transportation, low-carbon
communities, etc.)
2008 China’s Policies and Actions for
Addressing Climate Change
State Council
(2008)
2011 China’s Policies and Actions for
Addressing Climate Change
State Council
(2011a)
2011 Working plan of GHG emission control
for the twelfth FYP
State Council
(2011b)
2014 China’s National Plan on Climate
Change (2014–2020)
NDRC (2014a)
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primary energy production and coal consumption accounted for 68–69% of the total energy
consumption inChina during 2000–2010. TheRenewable Energy Lawof the People’s Republic of
China was passed in 2005 and was amended in 2009 (NPC 2009), aiming to promote renewable
energy development, to increase and secure energy supply, and to adjust energy structure. The
NDRC issued The 11th FYP for Renewable Energy Development (see NDRC 2008), seeking to
increase the share of renewable energy consumption in total energy consumption to 10% in 2010.
The NDRC also used subsidies to support the development of renewable energy and low-carbon
energy. Significantly, the above energy-related measures were driven by the government to focus
not only on climate change mitigation, but also on energy security and sustainable development.
4. INSTRUMENTS FOR GREENHOUSE EMISSION CONTROL IN CHINA
China has traditionally relied on standards and a pollution levy system to regulate pollution
discharge throughout the country. Recently, the Chinese government also decided to use permit
trading tomitigate climate change. Establishing a national carbonmarket, based on the experience
gained from seven regional pilot carbonmarkets, is at the top of the national policy agenda for the
thirteenth FYP period (2016–2020). A proposal to levy a carbon tax is also under discussion. In
this section, we therefore review the key instruments used for pollution control currently adopted
in China, which may help control not just criteria pollutants but also GHGs.
4.1. The Pollution Levy System
The pollution levy systemhas been themain economic instrument used by theChinese government
to control pollution since 1979. It covers a wide range of pollutants and polluters and has gen-
erated significant revenue that is used for pollution control. According to a speech given by Zou
(2014), between 1979 and 2013, the total amount of pollution fees collected topped RMB 239
billion yuan (∼US$37billion). By2014, the systemhadcoveredmore thanhalf amillion fee-paying
polluters. In essence, it is a fee systemwith significant downstreamcoverage, inwhich emission fees
are charged at the point they are discharged, and is based on the polluter-pays principle.
The levy system was initially proposed by the National Leading Group for Environmental
Protection at the end of 1978 and was piloted in 27 provinces during 1979–1981. With a docu-
ment entitled “Tentative Means for Charging Pollutant Discharge Fees” issued by the State
Council (State Council 1982), the levy system was formally established in 1982. The document
specifies that a pollution fee shall be charged on those pollutants that are discharged in violation of
national standards. The system regulates 21 pollutant types that fall into threemajor categories: (a)
air pollutants, such as SO2, H2S, NOx, and CO; (b) water pollutants, such as toxic materials (e.g.,
mercury, cadmium, arsenic) and wastewater constituents (e.g., COD, BOD, PH); and (c) solid
waste. Rather than charging fees on all 21 pollutants as a true Pigouvian tax schemewould, Article
5 of the document specifies that “among waste water, air pollution and solid waste discharged, if
more than two toxic materials (pollutants) are discharged from the same outlet, only the pollutant
that is required to pay for the highest fee amount shall be charged.”
The levy system was modified in 2003, when a new document entitled “Ordinances for Col-
lection and Utilization of Pollution Fees” was issued as State Council Decree No. 369 (State
Council 2003) to replace the previous “Tentative Means for Charging Pollutant Discharge Fees”
(State Council 1982). Four kinds of major modifications were represented in the new document.
First,more pollutantswere included in the levy system.Most notably, the document included noise
as anewcategory for pollution charge. For thepreviously existing three categories (i.e.,wastewater
discharge, air pollutants, and solid waste), the document expanded the coverage of pollutants. For
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example, for wastewater discharge, there were now 61 types of toxic materials and pollution
constituents; for air pollutants, 44 pollutants were covered. Second, for water, solid, and air
pollution, the government now charged the emission fee on the total amount of pollutant emitted,
and not only on the amount that exceeded the national standard. Third, for water there was a two-
tier fee structure,whereby the fee paid for the amount of emissions exceeding the national standard
was higher than the fee charged for the portion of emissions below the standard. This structurewas
similar to the block rate pricing structure common in water and electricity pricing. Fourth, fees
were charged formultiple pollutants rather than for a single pollutant. If more than two pollutants
were discharged from the same outlet, the fee was charged on pollutants that were ranked in the
first three places in terms of their pollutant equivalent (PE). The unit fees for wastewater discharge
and air pollutants were RMB 0.7 yuan and RMB 0.6 yuan, respectively. However, these per unit
fees set only the lower bound. Regionsmight be allowed to charge higher per unit fees, considering
their local conditions for pollution control.
For solid waste disposal, a fee was charged according to the quantity of solid waste disposed,
but differentiated unit prices were charged for different types of solid waste. For noise, a fee was
charged only for noise released in excess of national standards.
Compared with the old levy system, which essentially charged only for a single pollutant, the
revised levy system was somewhat improved but still left a significant portion of the pollutants
untaxed.Moreover, charging RMB 0.7 yuan/PE of wastewater disposal and RMB 0.6 yuan/PE of
air pollutants was considered far below the marginal external or abatement costs at or near the
socially optimal level of emissions. As a result, most firms chose to pay the much lower pollution
fee rather than abating the pollution (Wang et al. 2014).
The levy systemwas further revised in 2014with a document jointly released by theNDRC, the
Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Environmental Protection to adjust the fee schedule and
to tighten up the treatment of heavymetals (NDRC et al. 2014). The new levy systemwas slated to
be implemented at the end of June 2015. The document stipulates that the unit fee for wastewater
discharge (particularly regarding COD, ammonia, lead, mercury, cadmium, chromium, and
arsenic) shall be increased from 0.7 yuan/PE to 1.4 yuan/PE and that the unit fee for air pollutants
(particularly SO2 and NOx) shall be increased from 0.6 yuan/PE to 1.2 yuan/PE. To address the
increasing environmental hazards from heavy metal discharge to water bodies, the document
specifically stipulates that “the pollution fee must be charged on the discharge of lead, mercury,
cadmium, chromiumand arsenic according to their PE, regardlesswhether they are among the first
three major pollutants discharged.” For other pollutants, the new system still charges for only the
first three major pollutants.
Reviewing the evolution and design of the levy system, one can make the following major
observations regarding its main design features. First, although the system covers more than 100
pollutants falling into five major categories, the pollution charge is imposed only on the first three
major pollutants. Second, it has traditionally focused on regulating the discharge of SO2, NOx,
COD, and ammonia and has only recently paid attention to heavy metals. Third, even though
higher pollution rates will be in effect by the new system in 2015, they are believed to be below the
marginal external or abatement cost at or near the socially optimal emission level andmay thus not
provide strong incentives for firms to abate pollution (Wang et al. 2014).3
3According toWang et al. (2014), the new pollution charge rates to be applied in 2015 were actually calculated by taking the
average abatement cost of pollutants listed in the levy systemprevailing during 1982–2003andbyusing prices prevailing in the
1990s. Therefore, the current abatement cost ought to be higher, given China’s rapid economic development and increasing
inflation rate in the past two decades.
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Over time, a relatively solid legal system has been developed to support the levy system. One
pivotal law supporting the levy system is the Environmental Protection Law of People’s Republic
of China, which was tentatively enacted in 1979 (NPC 1979), amended in 1989 (NPC 1989), and
further revised in 2014 (NPC 2014). Article 18 of the 1979 law stipulates: “Pollutants discharged
in excess of the prescribed national discharge standards shall be charged a fee, based on the
quantity and concentration of discharged pollutants.”4 Article 43 of the 2014 law further
emphasizes: “Enterprises, institutional organizations and other production entities shall pay
a pollution fee according to relevant national stipulations. All collected pollution fees must be
exclusively used for pollution control. Entities that are charged for environmental tax are not
charged a pollution fee.” Over time, five other laws were gradually enacted and are the legal
cornerstones of the system. These five laws are Law of the People’s Republic of China on the
Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution (Article 11 in the 1987 version and Article 14 in
the 2000 revised version) (NPC 1987, 2000), Law of the People’s Republic of China on the
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution (Article 74 of the 2008 revised version) (NPC 2008),
Marine Environment Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China (Article 11 of the 1999
revised version) (NPC1999), Lawof the People’sRepublic ofChina on the Prevention andControl
of Environmental Pollution by SolidWaste (Article 56 of the 2004 version) (NPC 2004), and Law
of the People’s Republic of China on Prevention and Control of Pollution from Environmental
Noise (Article 16) (NPC 1996). In addition to these six national laws, a series of regulations and
acts have been issued by ministries and provincial governments. Local governments have also
issued a number of regulations to support the system.
Local environmental agencies at the county level are the key players enforcing the levy system.
The practical implementation of the system is as follows. At the beginning of each year, all pol-
luters are liable for paying their pollution fee ex ante. Firms, small business owners, and gov-
ernment agencies submit their pollution discharge plans for the year by filling out a registration
form released by theMinistry of Environmental Protection. They need to report the type, quantity,
and concentration of pollutants that they anticipate discharging during the year. The local gov-
ernment agencies then register the information submitted and use data sent from automatic
monitoring equipment for verification.5 If cheating is detected or data are not reported, the
government agencies decide on the types and quantity of pollution discharge for the firms. Hence
the levy system heavily relies on individual polluters’ self-reported information. Monitoring and
verification are of key importance to the system. These features are of course problematic for CO2
as a pollutant because its emissions are not really monitored for most sources.
Since 1979, the levy system has generated an important stream of revenues for environmental
protection inChina (Yang&Wang 1998). In 2013, annual pollution fee revenues were more than
RMB 2 billion yuan (equivalent to more than US$0.3 billion) (MEP 2014), which is a fivefold
increase in revenues collected compared with 1995. As specified in a series of documents issued by
the national government,6 the pollution fee collected by the local governmentsmust be included as
4In the Environmental ProtectionLawamended in1989,Article 18 states:“Enterprises and institutions discharging pollutants
in excess of the prescribed national or local discharge standards shall pay a fee for excessive discharge according to state
provisions and shall assume responsibility for eliminating and controlling the pollution.”
5In principle, the polluters must install automatic monitoring equipment. For those polluters that have difficulty installing
automatic monitoring equipment, other verification methods are also applied.
6These documents include “Tentative Means for Charging Pollutant Discharge Fees” issued by the State Council (1982),
“FinancialManagement andAccountingMethods forCharging Fees for PollutantsDischarged in Excess of Standards” jointly
issued by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Construction in 1984 (MOF & MOC 1984), and “Ordinances for
Collection and Utilization of Pollution Fees” issued by the State Council (2003).
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local fiscal revenue and earmarked for environmental protection; 80% of the pollution fee col-
lected must be directly used for pollution abatement
To reduce the possibility of misuse of the collected fees, the national government (in particular
theMinistry of Environmental Protection and theMinistry of Finance) has also issued policies that
require that the processes of fee collection and fee utilization be separate from each other. Despite
the above efforts, lack of transparency of fee management and utilization is still a major concern.
Moreover, as the amount of fees to be collected is based on polluters’ self-reported information
and verification is done by the local environmental agencies, at the local level major rent-seeking
concerns may result in capture of the local regulator.
4.2. China’s Pilot Carbon Markets
The potential establishment of a national carbon market has grown as a topic of interest since
2010. In the twelfth FYP, gradually establishing a carbon emission trading system is explicitly
listed as one important means to control GHG emissions in China. Since 2010, the central gov-
ernment has moved in the direction of establishing a national carbon market and has made an
ambitious plan to have a national carbon market in the early operational stages by 2016.
Responding to the call in the twelfth FYP for the establishment of a national carbonmarket and
to build experience, in 2011 the NDRC issued a notice to pilot carbon emission trading in five
municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Chongqing, and Shenzhen) and two provinces
(Guangdong and Hubei) between 2013 and 2015 (NDRC 2011a). In 2010, these seven regions
together had a total population of 256.4 million people (almost one-fifth of the country’s total
population) and a GDP of US$1.78 trillion (one-third of national total GDP); they emitted 1,533
Mt of CO2 (almost 17%of national total CO2 emissions), and their energy consumption accounted
for one-fifth of national total energy consumption (Jotzo 2013, Zheng 2014). Among the seven
regions, Hubei and Chongqing, which are located in inland China, are relatively less developed and
have economies that still heavily rely on the industrial sector, whereas Beijing and Shenzhen have
economies that are dominated by the service sector. The energy intensity levels also vary greatly
across these regions, with Shenzhen having the lowest level (0.6 ton/US$1,000) and Chongqing
having the highest level (1.4 ton/US$1,000) in 2010.
Within 2 years of the announcement made by NDRC, the seven markets were up and running.
The first pilot carbon market started operating in Shenzhen on June 18, 2013, followed by pilot
markets in Shanghai (November 26, 2013), Beijing (November 28, 2013), and Guangdong
(December 26, 2013). By June 19, 2014, when Chongqing opened its market, all seven pilot
carbon markets were fully operational.
This section summarizes key design features and the performance of these seven pilot carbon
markets. We discuss major issues related to the seven markets and potential challenges in estab-
lishing a national market.
4.2.1. Main design features of the regional markets. The key elements of any cap-and-trade
system are coverage and scope, cap setting, permit allocation, the MRV (monitoring, reporting,
and verification) system, and the compliance mechanism. As one of the stated purposes of the
regional pilot markets was experimentation, these regions were encouraged to explore different
models. Table 2 summarizes some key design features of these seven markets.
The seven pilot markets jointly covermore than 10 billion tCO2e (tons of CO2 equivalent) p.a.
during 2013–2015. Despite their differences in design features, all seven regional pilot markets
shared the following features, as discussed in the literature (e.g., Jiang et al. 2014, Jotzo&Löschel
2014, Munnings et al. 2014, Qi & Wang 2014, Qi et al. 2014, Wu et al. 2014, Zheng 2014):
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1. All the markets include the electricity sector and involve direct and indirect emissions.
Indirect emissions are mainly emissions from the consumption of electricity and heat.
Although including indirect emissions may encourage local carbon transformation on
the demand side in a regulated energy market in China, it also raises the concerns for
double counting of emissions related to power generation.
2. All the markets allow covered entities to use a certain number of verified offsets
generated by Chinese Certified Emission Reductions (CCERs) for compliance, although
the allowed proportion of offsets varies from 5% in Beijing and Shanghai to 10% in
Hubei, Guangdong, and Shenzhen.
3. All the markets prohibit borrowing but allow banking.
4. Covered entities in all seven markets are at the firm or organization level rather than at
the installation level, mainly because of the dearth of data collected at the installation
level. This is different from the EUEmissions Trading System (EUETS)market, inwhich
the covered entities are at the installation level.
As shown inTable 2, the annual emissions capped accounted for 33–60% of total emissions in
these provinces ormunicipalities. The annual emissions capped in each regionwere determined by
considering CO2 emission reduction targets specified by the national government for each region
and other key factors, such as economic growth, industrial structure, the structure of energy
consumption, and the potential for emission reductions in each region. In essence, much like
China’s national emission reduction target is framedas an intensity target, the emission caps for the
pilotmarkets are largely intensity based, denoted in terms ofCO2 per unit ofGDP.As Jotzo (2013)
and Han et al. (2012) discuss, the intensity-based target may increase the uncertainty over the
absolute amount of emissions arising from China’s continuous economic growth, from rapid
structural change, and from uncertainty over future GDP growth. Following this logic, the total
emissions in the pilot regions also become less predictable than in a scenario with an absolute cap.
Below we discuss some additional peculiarities of the individual pilot markets.
A different inclusion threshold was used to determine covered entities, with Shenzhen having
the lowest level (30,000 tCO2e p.a.) and Hubei having the highest level (annual energy con-
sumption of 60,000 tSCE7 p.a.). Altogether, the seven pilot markets covered more than 2,000
entities.
In terms of sectors covered, Hubei, Tianjin, Chongqing, and Guangdong covered only large
emitters from the industrial sector, whereas Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen, where the value
added of service sectors has a relatively high share of local GDP, covered both the industrial sector
and the service sector. In particular, in Beijing and Shenzhen, where the share of value added of the
service sectors is more than 60% and relatively low thresholds for inclusion are used, the total
number of entities covered in these two regions (635 entities in Shenzhen and 490 entities in
Beijing) is relatively bigger than in other regions. Covering more entities may help to control CO2
emissions in these two cities but also brings challenges in terms of administrative capacity. Re-
garding sources to be covered, Shanghai and Shenzhen covered both stationary andmobile sources
from transportation (such as aviation, railway, ports, and public transportation), whereas the
other five markets covered only stationary sources. The difference in covered sectors across these
markets implies potentially different abatement strategies and technologies across sectors.
Abatement strategies in the construction sector in Shenzhen, for example, will be quite different
from those employed in the steel, power, cement, and chemical industries in Guangdong. This
7tSCE denotes tons of standard coal equivalent. In the Chinese setting, 1 tSCE is roughly equivalent to 2 tCO2e.
24 Auffhammer  Gong
A
nn
u.
 R
ev
. R
es
ou
r. 
Ec
on
. 2
01
5.
7:
11
-3
4.
 D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 w
w
w
.an
nu
al
re
vi
ew
s.o
rg
 
A
cc
es
s p
ro
vi
de
d 
by
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 o
f C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 - 
Be
rk
el
ey
 o
n 
06
/2
5/
19
. F
or
 p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nl
y.
 
heterogeneity in mitigation strategies provides a potentially fruitful and interesting avenue for
future empirical research.
All themarkets allocatedmost (or all) permits freely on the basis of historical emissions (known
as grandfathering) and benchmarking. However, Guangdong, Hubei, and Shenzhen also auc-
tioned a small portion of permits, which is similar to themodels used inCalifornia’s cap-and-trade
system and the EU ETS phase III. In Hubei, auctions occurred only for permits reserved by the
government. InGuangdong, the governmentmandated that all covered emitters obtain 3%of their
annual allowable permits through auctions in 2013. However, this regulation was lifted in 2014.
In 2014, in Guangdong, the proportion of auctioned permits was designed to be 5% for the power
sector and 3% for other sectors such as steel, petrochemicals, and cement. Permits were allocated
on a yearly basis in all other six markets, except for Shanghai, where permits were freely allocated
in a lump sum fashion in 2013 for the period of 2013–2015.
As for market participation, individuals are still restricted from participating in Beijing,
whereas markets in Shenzhen, Tianjin, Guangdong, and Hubei are open to individual partici-
pation. Institutional investors are allowed to participate in the Hubei and Shanghai markets, and
foreign investors are also permitted to participate in the Shenzhen and Guangdong markets.
All pilot markets have started to develop their own MRV system. However, they have used
different protocols for MRV, and the MRV systems are at different developmental stages in dif-
ferent regions. For example, Shanghai is at a relatively advanced level among all regional markets
in terms of developing methodologies, as it has released guidelines for GHG accounting and
reporting and has developed a series of accounting and reporting methodologies for nine sectors,
such as heating and power, steel, chemical industry, and aviation. In contrast, Chongqing has only
released guidelines for GHGaccounting and reporting. In general, most regions still have a limited
number of qualified or competent verification entities and individuals. Shenzhen has designated 18
verification entities, followed by Beijing (15), Chongqing (7), Shanghai and Guangdong (5 each),
Tianjin (4), and Hubei (2).
So far, all pilot markets have established their own trading platforms and have set up registry
systems.Five regions—Beijing, Tianjin, Guangdong, Shanghai, and Shenzhen—have used existing
environmental exchanges as trading platforms. Most regions have set up specific rules for trading
and market oversight. Nonetheless, transparency in information disclosure is still a big issue for
most of these markets.
Most pilot carbon markets, except for Shenzhen, do not have strong legal support. In Shenzhen,
the carbon market is supported by a legal document (“Provisions of Carbon Emission
Management of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone”) passed by the Standing Committee of the
Shenzhen Municipal People’s Congress, the legislative body in Shenzhen Municipality. All six
other markets are supported only by normative documents issued by provincial and municipal
governments, such as decrees of provincial government (Chongqing, Hubei, and Guangdong),
mayors’ decrees (Shanghai), and orders issued by the general office of a municipal government
(Tianjin). Because the orders issued by the general office of a municipal government are at the
lowest level on the spectrum of normative documents, the Tianjin market has the weakest ad-
ministrative foundation for enforcement. As the success of compliancemarkets critically hinges on
strong legal support, the lack of legal support in most pilot markets in China raises big concerns
with respect to effective enforcement.
Compliance in all markets is determined annually, which means that each year, all covered
emittersmust surrender their permits before a deadline spanning from the end ofMay (Tianjin and
Hubei) to July (Beijing andGuangdong). Before the deadline, a third partymust verify emissions of
all covered emitters. On the deadline date, an entity’s emissions in the past year must not be in
excess of the annual allowable permits allocated to it. If a certain emitter has a higher level of
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emissions than its annual allowable permits, it is required to buy permits or CCERs from the
carbon market. Otherwise, it has to pay penalties. All pilot markets except for Tianjin have
specified financial penalties for noncompliance: The financial penalties range fromRMB50,000 to
150,000 yuan/tCO2e or between three and five times the market average (or highest) prices for
excess emissions.
If an entity has a surplus of permits, most regional markets allow the covered entities to carry
the surplus forward for compliance in future years. However, in the Hubei market, the surplus
permits expire on the last business day in June of each year.
4.2.2. Performance of permit markets. From June 18, 2013—the opening date of the first re-
gional pilot market (Shenzhen)—to November 21, 2014, the total volume of carbon traded in all
seven regional markets was 13.14 MtCO2e. Total trading value was approximately RMB 489
million yuan (equivalent to approximately US$78 million).
Figure 3 shows the market share of each regional market as a percentage of total emissions
traded and the value of transactions. Among all seven markets, the Hubei market has the highest
share of trading volume (46.3%of 13.14MtCO2e). In contrast, Chongqing has the lowest market
share of trading volume (1.1%, equivalent to 0.145MtCO2e). In fact, all 0.145MtCO2eof trading
in theChongqingmarket took place on its opening date (i.e., June 20, 2014), with an average price
of RMB 30.74 yuan/tCO2e (∼US$5 per ton). Although Guangdong had the highest level of
emissions capped, the market appears to be not very active, as the trading volume accounted for
only 10.3% (approximately 135 MtCO2) of the total trading volume of all regional markets. In
terms of the trading value,Hubei also has the highest share of all regionalmarkets (29.7%ofRMB
489 million yuan), followed by Shenzhen (almost one-fourth of RMB 489 million yuan).
Generally, the market prices in all seven regional markets in 2014 were in the range of RMB
20–90 yuan (∼$US3–15), although in 2013 the prices were quite volatile in the Shenzhen market.
Figure 4 shows the prices in each of the markets.8 As shown in Figure 4, the market prices were
relatively stable in the Beijing and Shanghai markets: The prices in Beijing were between RMB 40
and 80 yuan/tCO2e, and those in Shanghai were between RMB 28 and 48 yuan/tCO2e. The peak
prices in these two markets occurred between June and July of 2014, the deadline for compliance.
Theprices in theShanghaimarket dropped to a large degree after the compliancedeadline but started
to recover after October 2014. According to observations made by the Shanghai Environment and
EnergyExchange, the recoveryofmarket prices in theShanghaimarketafterOctoberof 2014maybe
attributable to Shanghai’s new policy allowing institutional investors to participate in the market.
Prices in the Guangdong market display greater fluctuations than do prices in other markets.
Guangdong prices reached a peak in July 2014 and have continued to drop since then, especially
after August 2014. Similar to the case for the Beijing and Shanghai markets, the peak price in July
2014 was driven by firms’ incentives for compliance, as July 15 was the deadline for firms to
surrender their permits allocated in 2013. The decreasing price after August 2014may be because
of the increased annual allowable permits (408MtCO2e in 2014 compared with 388MtCO2e in
2013) issued in the Guangdong market.
Market prices in the Hubei market were quite stable but stayed at a relatively low price level,
within a range of RMB 20–30 yuan/tCO2e. This stability at a low price may be attributable to
a range of possible factors, including the relatively large number of annual allowable permits
allocated (amounting to 324 MtCO2e); diversified participants, including individuals and
enterprises; and the mark off of surplus permits at the end of the annual compliance period.
8We did not include Chongqing because its transactions took place on a single date (June 20, 2014).
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4.2.3. Main issues with pilot markets. The seven regions have made impressive progress in
establishing pilot carbon markets and experimenting with different models. These experiments
will likely provide useful information feeding into the national government’s deliberations over
a national system. Nonetheless, the current fast-paced progress appears to be driven largely by
strong political motivations and enthusiasm rather than by the implementation of carefully
evaluated and well-crafted designs based on a process that takes significant time. Here are four
issues we identify with regard to the currently existing pilot markets.
First, the lack of legal support and legal infrastructure is a fundamental obstacle to a carbon
trading system taking effect. A cap-and-trade system in its essence is a compliancemarket critically
relying on strong legal support for enforcement, including clearly defined property rights, rules for
allocating permits, and specification of legal obligations. The lack of legal support in the current
pilot markets in China not only reduces covered emitters’ incentives to comply but also creates
significant uncertainties in the market. Market-based instruments hinge on well-defined property
rights. Without a clearly defined property right through the legal system, it is hard to imagine that
a full-fledged market will be an effective operation.
Second, the lack of reliable emission inventory and monitoring data is a critical constraint to
setting proper emission caps. Although setting the capmay be the most important policy decision,
in China emission data are scarce. Without good data, the emission cap will likely not be set
properly, which will eventually decrease the effectiveness of the trading system for reducing CO2
emissions. Furthermore, the current tendency to set caps on the basis of achieving emission in-
tensity targets instead of total CO2 emission targets introduces year-to-year fluctuation based on
GDP and obscures the overall goal of meaningful climate policy: the reduction of CO2 emissions.
Third, lack of market infrastructure and administrative capacity is another key constraint. A
well-functioning carbon market should be strongly supported by a well-developed MRV system,
by good methodologies for accounting and measurement, and by a strong technical team to do
verifications. These aspects are largely missing in most of the pilot markets.
Fourth, the lack of transparent information gives rise to significant uncertainty in the
market. So far, most pilot markets lack information disclosure in terms of emission data of
covered emitters, the methods used to determine total emissions to be capped and permit al-
location, the types of firms participating in the markets, and the firms’ detailed transactions.
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Figure 3
Share of market size of each individual market in all seven markets. Data from Shenzhen China Emission
Exchange (2014).
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Such a lack of information disclosurewill inevitably dampen the incentives for potential market
participants.
4.2.4. The path forward: regulating carbon at the national level. As the national government is
determined to establish a national carbon market during 2016–2020, some initial preparations
have been made. In 2013, the NDRC issued guidelines for firm-level GHG accounting and
reporting for 10 industrial sectors, such as steel, petrochemistry, power generation, cement, glass,
ceramics, and aviation (NDRC 2013). On December 10, 2014, the NDRC issued a document
entitled “Tentative Means for Managing Carbon Emission Trading” as a concrete step toward
establishing a national carbon market (NDRC 2014c). Despite these necessary steps taken to
develop a national carbon market, further obstacles that are similar to the challenges faced by the
regional markets discussed above will have to be overcome before such a market can go online.
First, China needs to develop a legal framework to support the enforcement of a carbonmarket.
As the “Tentative Means for Managing Carbon Emission Trading” document issued by the
NDRC (2014c) is only a sector-based, normative document, a national carbon market supported
by this type of document raises concerns for the legal foundation of its future enforcement, given
the jurisdictional complexities involved in enforcing China’s large portfolio of environmental
regulations. Second, China needs to invest in the necessary market infrastructure, such as trading
platforms, registry systems, and an MRV system at the national level. Third, the lack of good
emission data presents a big challenge in terms of setting a cap, deciding which sectors should be
covered and howpermits should be allocated to the covered entities, and designing accounting and
verification rules. The above key components of awell-designed carbonmarket need to be built on
reliable GHG emission (or energy consumption) data at the national, provincial, and/or firm (and
even installation) level. Although experimentation through pilot carbon markets has enabled the
government to collect emission data from more than 2,000 covered emitters (Zheng 2014), the
existing data are far from sufficient, as China’s current statistical system has barely covered GHG
emission data, in particular data at the firmor installation level. Fourth, the coexistence ofmultiple
policies targeted at carbonand energy emission reductionsmaydampen the price signal in a carbon
market—similar to the experience of the EU ETS. Finally, the Chinese government may have to
make a politically uncomfortable trade-off between efficiency and equity when making allocation
plans across different regions.
5. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
To effectively control GHG emissions, China may choose from a mix of climate policies ranging
from a direct regulatory (command-and-control) system to market-based policies, such as permit
trading or a carbon tax. China may continue using administrative and political measures to im-
plement a direct regulatory system, but past experience has demonstrated that forcing a 19.1%
energy intensity reduction during the eleventh FYP came at the costs of blackouts of industries and
forcing a number of provinces to shut down large swaths of industrial capacity (Han et al. 2012).
Minimizing the cost of achieving a given environmental goal is more likely to be achieved by
a market-based approach with clearly defined property rights as a foundation. Therefore, it is
worthwhile for the Chinese government to contemplate alternative policies such as a cap-and-
trade system or a carbon tax.
Regarding the economic instrument to be used, the choice between a quantity-based carbon
permit market and a price-based carbon tax has been at the heart of environmental economics
literature. According to the seminal work of Weitzman (1974), in the absence of uncertainties,
a carbon tax and a permit market should in theory achieve the same outcome in terms of emission
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reductions, as both use carbon pricing to incentivize firms to reduce their emissions to a socially
optimal level. However, if there exists uncertainty around marginal abatement costs, these two
instruments can lead to very different levels of social welfare and total emissions in equilibrium.
According to Weitzman, if the slope of the marginal benefit curve is flat, the price-based tax
instrument may be preferred; if the slope of the marginal cost curve is relatively flat, the quantity-
based instrument may be preferred.
In practice, although a carbon tax can help generate significant revenues for the government, it
often faces strong political resistance. Which instrument should be used may also depend on the
political, legal, and social context.
In China, establishment of a national carbon market has very strong political support, as the
central government appears determined to use this system as an engine for more comprehensive
economic reform of the energy sector and for technological advancement, in addition to the role of
such a market in helping to reduce CO2 emissions. A carbon market may also face much less
resistance from firms. Nonetheless, China still faces a series of challenges for developing a national
market from scratch. The costs of setting up such a market and the requirements for monitoring
and enforcement are significant.
A simple carbon tax is an appealing andmuch simpler alternative that can draw on the existing
significant policy infrastructure of the pollution fee system. First, China has more than 30 years of
implementing a levy system, which is an admittedly imperfect Pigouvian system. In addition to
developing a relatively solid legal foundation supporting this system, the government has also
developed the necessary administrative capacities to implement this policy. Moreover, firms in
China are also accustomed to paying pollution fees. So far, the system has accumulated some solid
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Price changes in regional markets. Data from Shenzhen China Emission Exchange (2014).
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statistical information for firms liable to pay a fee: In 2013, the system covered 431,100 entities
(MEP 2014). Therefore, instituting a carbon tax scheme in this levy system may result in much
lower transaction costs compared with the case of quickly establishing a national carbon
market.
The advantage of a carbon tax is that one can charge the carbon tax far upstream and thus
avoid having to collect the tax directly from millions of sources. The key to success in regulating
CO2 emissions is to capture those large emitters. A carbon tax imposed on upstream firms using
fossil fuels may capture a relatively high share of CO2 emissions. Rather than proposing to
completely shift from the levy system to a tax scheme, we think it may be more reasonable for
China to consider the coexistence of a carbon tax scheme and a levy system. The levy system may
still play its necessary roles in controlling criteria pollution and generating local revenues for
environmental protection, whereas the carbon tax should be collected by the central government
from fossil fuel producers.Meanwhile, the administrative capacities used in the levy system for fee
collection and enforcement of the system may also be used for the tax system.
For the carbon tax system to work, the key will be getting the tax level right. In the proposed
scenario, we do not claim to know what that number is. We simply suggest a simpler and more
workable system than a carbon market to regulate carbon emission.
If the Chinese government is set on adopting a carbon market at the national level, we propose
the potential advancement of a dual-control methodology that investigates not only the govern-
ment setting of the cap, but also improving the measurement of accurate emission data. In the
electrical engineering literature, the latter aspect is often referred to as M-measurement feedback
control methodology. The relevant literature goes back to Prescott (1972), and a practical ap-
plication is found in Rausser & Freebairn (1974).
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